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I Introduction
One of the conclusions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) emphasized
the need to strengthen fiscal governance in the EU Member States through the de-
velopment of national budgetary rules that should complement the EU
framework. The Council acknowledged the important role national institutions
could play in that respect. The Council also called for reliable budgetary statistics
and realistic, even cautious, macroeconomic forecasts (Buti, 2006).1 
These conclusions draw on the now generally accepted view, both by academics
and policy makers, that the national institutional framework affects budgetary
outcomes: some institutional characteristics lead to tighter budgetary discipline
than others. As was shown in a report prepared for the Dutch Ministry of Finance
(Hallenberg et al., 2001), budgetary practices vary extensively across Member
States: some governments produce their economic forecasts in-house and leave
the decision on what adjustments to make to the Finance Minister, while others
use forecasts from independent organizations and establish strict rules on how
changes in forecasts lead to changes in annual targets. 
Over the last twenty years specific circumstances constrained Belgium to put in
place institutions providing independent inputs, analyses and recommendations
in the area of fiscal policy. Firstly, the regionalization of the Belgian state at the
end of the eighties, in a context of very high budget deficits and a soaring public
debt (respectively 7% and 125% of GDP in 1988), forced the government to take ac-
tion in order to avoid overspending arising from independent regional
governments. Consequently, the High Council of Finance (HCF) was reformed in
1989 and one of its new tasks was to monitor the fiscal policy of regional govern-
ments and to formulate medium-term financial objectives for the federated
entities. The HCF also received a mandate to assess the convergence programmes.
Secondly, as the Maastricht criteria for entry into the European Monetary Union
were set in national accounts concepts, the National Accounts Institute (NAI) was
created in 1994 in order to ensure the quality and the independency of the main
economic statistics and macroeconomic forecasts upon which the budget was
based. Following various reports on population ageing and its impact on public
finances, a Study Committee on Ageing was created in 2001 within the HCF.
The role of the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB) in the budgetary process is mani-
fold but limited to positive economics, as it does not make policy
recommendations. The FPB produces, on behalf of the NAI, the macroeconomic
forecasts used by the Belgian federal government for drawing up its budget and
prepares, jointly with the National Bank of Belgium, the general government ac-
1. The Commission’s initial proposal that stability programmes should be based on macroeco-
nomic assumptions provided by the Commission was rejected. Even so, these assumptions
should still be used as a benchmark.Working Paper 4-06
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count within the national accounts. Each spring, the FPB also publishes a medium-
term economic outlook for the Belgian economy. This report is updated in au-
tumn and serves as a starting point for the elaboration of the stability programme.
The FPB also holds the secretariat of the Study Committee on Ageing and produc-
es its long-term projections of age-related budgetary expenditures.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the role of fiscal councils in the budgetary
planning process in Belgium and to emphasize the part taken by the Federal Plan-
ning Bureau in producing independent macroeconomic forecasts. The
importance of independent forecasts in the budgetary process should not be un-
derestimated, as illustrated in Jonung and Larch (2006). These authors show
evidence that for several large European countries, official growth forecasts are
biased towards optimism and that this forecasting bias, coupled with inertia in
the budgetary process, has hampered fiscal consolidation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concept of fiscal
councils and describe the two main institutions that have to be considered in the
Belgian budgetary process. The importance of independent institutions to pro-
duce the official forecasts is stressed in section 3 and illustrated with an
assessment of the quality of the Belgian forecasts. The last section concludes the
paper by drawing some lessons from the Belgian experience.Working Paper 4-06
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II Role of Fiscal Councils in the Belgian budgetary 
process
Based on the model of independent central banks, a number of economists have
recently suggested that a more or less extensive part of fiscal policy should be en-
trusted to an independent fiscal agency so as to avoid the injudicious use of
discretion by politicians. These proposals are supported by evidence showing
that fiscal policy discretion often entails a deficit bias or leads to a pro-cyclical be-
haviour by policymakers in good times (Halleberg et al., op. cit.). Political and
distributive conflicts, time inconsistency, short-time horizons of policymakers or
the membership of a (small) country to a monetary union can all be quoted as
possible underlying political or economic reasons for a deficit bias and pro-cycli-
cal fiscal policies (IMF, 2005).
The International Monetary Fund identifies two types of fiscal agencies. The first
type, called Independent Fiscal Authorities (IFAs), would receive a mandate com-
parable to that of independent central banks but on the fiscal side, i.e. to set and
enforce long-term fiscal objectives and annual budgetary targets. Although theo-
retical arguments can be put forward in favour of setting up such institutions,
there are to date no IFAs in operation in any country, probably reflecting the issue
of democratic accountability.
A less drastic and more realistic option lies in the setup of Fiscal Councils (FC),
which do not receive any specific authority over fiscal policy but undertake anal-
yses and assessments of fiscal developments and policies. They could provide in
particular:
- independent macroeconomic forecasts for evaluating tax revenues and
public expenditure;
- public finance forecasts with a focus on fiscal balances;
- impact analyses of shocks or policies;
- policy recommendations such as rules, targets and strategies;
- an assessment of fiscal performance in comparison with the targets or
rules adopted by the government or Parliament.
The first three items are in the domain of what has been called "positive econom-
ics".1 It requires sound statistical and econometric expertise. It also entails large
investment in methods, data collection and software.
1. This dichotomy between positive and normative economics was first introduced by Milton
Friedman. According to Friedman, positive economics has to do with "what is", while normative
economics has to do with "what ought to be". Positive economics is a social science, and as such
is subject to the same checks on the basis of evidence as any science. By contrast, normative eco-
nomics has a moral or ethical aspect, and as such goes beyond what a science can say.Working Paper 4-06
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The remaining two items are in the domain of "normative economics". They re-
quire other types of resources: especially, competent and well-informed experts
in economics and public finances, who also have a very good knowledge of pol-
itics. They have to take into account not only the political options and preferences
of the government but also what is feasible as first best or second best solutions.
This is a complicated and subtle task, which includes the capacity to convince and
to influence the government and public opinion. Positive and normative econom-
ics are closely related, with normative economics requesting information and
analyses from positive economics, although they have very different roles.
The complex institutional framework of the Belgian state and the dramatic dete-
rioration of the fiscal stance in the seventies and eighties forced the country to put
in place FC-type institutions.
A.Progressive build-up of Belgian institutions
There are two fiscal councils which have to be considered in the Belgian budget-
ary planning process: the High Council of Finance (HCF) and the National
Accounts Institute (NAI). These institutions were not created from the onset with
their present role in mind.1 They are the result of a progressive and maturing
process. The starting point was the regionalization of the Belgian State at the end
of the eighties, when the country became a federal state with three Regions and
three Communities. Although taxes are still essentially collected at the federal
level, part of these tax receipts is transferred to the regional level. With a very high
public debt (exceeding 120% of GDP at the end of the eighties), Belgium could not
afford to run the risk of further government overspending arising from inde-
pendent regional governments. In 1989, the High Council of Finance was
reformed in depth. One of its new tasks was to monitor fiscal policy of the region-
al governments and to recommend, each year, a coordinated fiscal plan for the
various governments.2 To this end the section "Public sector borrowing require-
ments" was established within the HCF by the 1989 special law related to the
financing of the Communities and the Regions. This law instituted the financial
relations between the Central Government and the federated entities. Through
this law, a monitoring mechanism was put in place in order to keep a close control
on the borrowing requirements and borrowing capacity of the federal govern-
ment as well as of the federated entities. The section "Public sector borrowing
requirements" of the HCF determined the medium-term financial objectives for
the federated entities. These objectives were included in the first Belgian Conver-
gence Plan in 1992. They materialised the contribution of the federated entities to
the stabilization process of the whole public sector and henceforth the respect of
the criteria fixed at the EU level. This first Convergence Plan also explicitly stated
that the section "Public sector borrowing requirements" received the mission to
monitor the realisation of the objectives stated in the Convergence Plans.
1. This remark is mainly true for the HCF.
2. Other federal or quasi-federal EU Member States have put in place councils with a similar man-
date - such as the Financial Planning Councils in Germany or the Council of Fiscal and Finance
Policy in Spain - to coordinate the fiscal policies of the regions, to agree on the regions’ financial
framework and to avoid excessive debt build-up, in accordance with the Stability and Growth
Pact.Working Paper 4-06
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Following various reports on the consequences of population ageing, the issue of
the long-term sustainability of public finances emerged in the public debate in the
nineties. In 2001, a Study Committee on Ageing was created within the HCF in or-
der to analyse the budgetary and social consequences of ageing.
The setup of the second Fiscal Council was related to the entry of Belgium into
the European Monetary Union. As the Maastricht targets were set in national ac-
counts concepts, the National Accounts Institute was created in 1994 (law of 21
December) in order to ensure the quality and the independency of the main Bel-
gian economic statistics and macroeconomic forecasts upon which the budget
was based, as well as to improve their credibility at the international level. The
missions of the NAI are shared by three associated institutions, namely Statistics
Belgium, the National Bank of Belgium and the Federal Planning Bureau.
B.Institutional separation between positive and normative 
economics
The positive economics side of the Belgian budgetary process can be described as
follows. The National Accounts Institute is a special purpose vehicle - it has no
staff and no resources - created to coordinate the production of the main national
macroeconomic statistics and the macroeconomic forecasts underlying the feder-
al budget and to ensure the independency and the quality of these statistics.
According to the organic law, the NAI delegates its tasks to the three above-men-
tioned institutions. The production of statistics is subcontracted to the National
Bank of Belgium for the national and regional accounts, the foreign trade statis-
tics, the financial accounts and the supply and use tables and to the Federal
Planning Bureau for the short-term macroeconomic forecasts (called the “eco-
nomic budget”) and for the input-output tables, and to these last two institutions
jointly for the general government account. Statistics Belgium is in charge of col-
lecting the data upon which the above-mentioned statistics are based. Note that,
of all missions carried out by the NAI, only the forecasting activities can, strictly
speaking, be considered as typical tasks for a fiscal council, although providing
high quality and reliable budgetary statistics is also recognised as an important
input for fiscal policy (Council of the EU, 2005).
It is worth mentioning here that under its own name, the FPB publishes a
medium-term economic outlook each year in spring. This report is a very detailed
macroeconomic projection. It is the only occasion on which the FPB publishes
forecasts of the public sector accounts as well as a comprehensive analysis of
public finances.1 These forecasts are updated in autumn as a starting point for the
elaboration of the stability programme.
This brings us to the level of normative economics. The HCF is composed of high
level experts: academics, members of the National Bank and representatives of
the federal and regional administrations. The secretariat is held by the research
department of the Ministry of Finance. The “Public sector borrowing require-
ment” section of the HCF publishes two yearly reports. The first report, published
around March, assesses the stability programme of the previous year. The second,
released in June/July, analyses the borrowing requirements of each government
1. The economic budget does not include forecasts of the general government account.Working Paper 4-06
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and makes recommendations on short and especially medium-term fiscal targets
(and since 2002, also on long-term targets) for the general government and its dif-
ferent entities. The Study Committee on Ageing produces a yearly report
including projections of age-related budgetary expenditures.1 The section "Public
sector borrowing requirements" is supposed to take these projections into ac-
count for its fiscal policy recommendations. With the new law regarding the
setup of the Silver Fund2, the section will also advise the government on the
amount to be transferred every year to this fund.
The diagram below gives an overview of the main activities of the fiscal councils,
distinguishing the positive and normative side, and their link with the budget.
Table 1 in the appendix summarizes the timing of the main activities of the fiscal
councils regarding the budgetary process.3 The process starts in May with the re-
lease of the medium and long-term projections. The recommendations by the HCF
follow in June. A provisional short-term macroeconomic forecasting exercise is
prepared by the NAI in July and revised in the economic budget in September. The
federal budget is presented to the Parliament in October. In the wake of the new
budget, the Stability Programme is updated and extended. The economic budget
is reassessed in February and precedes the budgetary control of March. 
1. The FPB holds the secretariat of the Study Committee on Ageing and produces its long-term pro-
jections.
2. This fund was set up to finance the additional expenses resulting from ageing in the various stat-
utory pension schemes between 2010 and 2030.
3. As a reminder, the month of release of the European Commission and Eurosystem forecasts are






































III Importance of independent institutions 
and forecasts
As a survey on budgetary rules and norms in EU Member States indicates, only
three out of fifteen governments (Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands)1 rely
solely on national independent agencies to produce macroeconomic forecasts
that determine public revenue and spending projections for future years (Hallen-
berg et al., 2001). The same survey reveals that only states where respondents
thought that estimates were “deliberately cautious”, had independent planning
agencies that made growth forecasts. Countries with cautious growth forecasts
also seemed to have higher than expected budget balances as indicated by a pos-
itive correlation between growth and budget errors.
In analysing the track record of budgetary forecasts contained in the Stability and
Convergence programmes, Hallenberg et al. (2004) found that countries with
overly optimistic growth assumptions were also those with the largest slippages
from budgetary targets. Other studies show evidence of a clear link between
budgetary outcomes and growth forecasts. Larch and Salto (2005) and very re-
cently Jonung and Larch (2006) show that official forecasts for (real and potential)
GDP are biased towards optimism for Germany, Italy and France2 and that this
forecasting bias, coupled with inertia in the budgetary process, is passed on to the
structural deficit. These authors conclude that the bias of official growth forecasts
partly explains the poor performance of fiscal consolidation observed in recent
years in the euro area. They also stress that, although in budgetary terms an over-
estimation of potential GDP growth produces ex post the same results as active
expansionary fiscal policy, the former requires another form of policy response to
improve fiscal consolidation. These conclusions led the authors to plead for the
establishment of independent forecasting authorities in all EU Member States. The
usefulness of their proposal is supported by empirical evidence showing that in
the few Member States mentioned above, where official forecasts are produced by
independent national agencies, these forecasts show no statistically significant bi-
as. Furthermore these independent national agencies could play a leading role in
strengthening national ownership of the budgetary surveillance procedure.
To reduce the risk of bias in the official national growth forecasts, the initial pack-
age of the Commission concerning the reform of the SGP contained a proposal to
delegate the economic growth projections used in the budgetary plans to the
1. Luxembourg partly relies on forecasts made by the National Statistic Institute (STATEC) but also
uses OECD and European Commission estimates by taking the lowest estimates. Ireland exclu-
sively bases its forecasts on assessments by international agencies. In the eleven remaining coun-
tries, the Ministry of Finance relies on ‘in-house’ macroeconomic forecasts for its budgetary
plans.
2. The United Kingdom is the exception among the ‘big four’ with unbiased and remarkably accu-
rate forecasts.Working Paper 4-06
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Commission (Deroose and Langedijk, 2005). A comparison of the forecasting per-
formances by Member States and by the Commission ( Hallenberg et al., op. cit.)
reveals that GDP forecasts produced by the latter have been more accurate for sev-
eral countries but notably not for Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
A.Official forecasting procedure in Belgium
In Belgium the legal status of the institutions involved greatly contributes to the
independence of the forecasting authority. The FPB is a public institution and, as
any other public institution, has ministers who oversee it and set its budget.
However, because of its specific tasks, it is independent in fulfilling them. To earn
this independence, the FPB has a policy of being very transparent: it publishes its
forecasts, methods, models and data.1 It also assesses its own forecasting per-
formance.2 Staff recruitment is governed by a transparent procedure and the
candidates are appointed on the proposal of the Bureau’s managing board. Be-
sides the federal government, the Central Economic Council, the National Labour
Council and the legislative chambers may apply to the FPB to assess policy meas-
ures. It should be repeated that the role of the FPB is limited to positive economics,
it does not make policy recommendations.
The figures contained in the economic budget are discussed and approved by the
Board of the NAI and are therefore considered as the official forecasts. The Board
is composed of the highest civil servant of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the
Governor and a director of the National Bank, the Commissioner of the FPB and
his deputy and the Director General and a director of Statistics Belgium. A scien-
tific committee, chaired by the Commissioner of the FPB and regrouping the main
institutional users of the forecasts, also discusses the economic budget. The
endorsement of the forecasts by the various independent institutions represented
in the Board and the scientific committee makes political intervention very diffi-
cult, as the credibility of all institutions involved is at stake.
Whether the Law of December 1994 (which created the National Accounts Insti-
tute) imposes a formal obligation for the government to use the economic budget
is probably disputable from a juridical point of view. However, up to now, the
forecasts have always been taken into account by the government. Because the in-
stitution has achieved high credibility, not following the forecasts would entail a
loss of reputation for the government. In times of uncertainty, the government
can be more cautious and include safety margins in the budget, for instance to
compensate for growth surprises or unforeseen rises in interest rates.
1. All available on the website: http://www.plan.be. The document describing the economic
budget is published twice a year. For a detailed account of the forecasting process see Dobbelaere
et. al. (2003).
2. See for instance: Dobbelaere and Hertveldt (2004).Working Paper 4-06
9
B.Assessing the quality of the economic budget
The economic budget is released twice a year, once in the summer of the year t-1
for the preparation of the budget of the year t and once in February of the year t
for the budgetary control of the year t. The quarterly macroeconometric model
Modtrim1 serves as a central tool for producing the economic budget. The mod-
el’s results, however, are adjusted on the basis of experts’ views and are also
adapted to take into account the most recent business cycle information, for in-
stance stemming from leading indicators.
The economic budget supplies forecasts for a large range of economic variables.
Here only two variables, namely real GDP growth and CPI inflation, will be exam-
ined. It concerns two global series that are important for the users of the economic
budget. A choice to make first is to define what is considered as the outcome. For
inflation, this is quite straightforward as the monthly published CPI is never re-
vised. GDP growth figures, however, are subject to significant revisions. To avoid
that unpredictable factors in the national accounts (such as methodological
changes) would affect the analysis, outcomes are defined as the figures published
in the first version of the national accounts of the year concerned.
Besides the problem of what should be chosen as outcomes, post-mortem analy-
ses are generally surrounded by other problems. In particular, the limited size of
the sample should lead to a cautious interpretation of the results that can be in-
fluenced by some outliers. One should also bear in mind that accuracy is only one
aspect of quality. Other important quality features are for instance coherence and
completeness. A full quality assessment should take into account all these aspects
simultaneously.
The most intuitive indicator to evaluate the size of forecast errors is the mean ab-
solute error (MAE), that yields the average difference between forecasts and
realisations in percentage points (see Table 2). A look at the declining profile of
the MAEs, especially for GDP growth, shows that the additional information that
becomes available between the first and the second forecasting round significant-
ly increases the accuracy of FPB projections, which proves the usefulness of the
February updating of the economic budget.
Another way to evaluate the accuracy of FPB projections, is to compare them with
naive forecasts. Three kinds of naive forecasts have been examined: a random
walk (Theil 1), a 10-year moving average growth rate forecast (Theil 2) and an ARI-
MA projection (Theil 3). Theil coefficients are calculated as the ratio between the
root mean square error of the reference forecasts and of the naive forecasts.
Table 2 shows that naive forecasts are less accurate than the economic budget in
all cases for CPI and in round 2 for GDP. Theil coefficients exceed unity only for
Theil 2 and Theil 3 for GDP gr owth during the first r ound. As shown in the
Graph 1, there has undeniably been one period of systematic over-optimism for
the years 2001-2003, a period with successive bad surprises following the technol-
ogy hype of 1999-2000. This is however not systematically the case over the whole
sample. Theil coefficients fall below unity if these specific years are removed from
the sample period. In conclusion, our findings confirm the commonly accepted
view that over a 4 to 6-quarter horizon, structural model based forecasts outper-
form naive forecasts. 
1. See Hertveldt and Lebrun (2003) for a detailed description of the model.Working Paper 4-06
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The size of the forecast errors is one thing, but the nature of those errors is at least
as important. An interesting way to check whether systematic forecast errors can
be found, is to decompose the mean square error (MSE) into three components:
(i) the bias proportion (BP) measures which part of the error is due to systematic
over- or underestimation; (ii) the variance proportion (VP) provides the part of the
error owing to the misforecasting of the systematic component of the variability
of outcomes; (iii) the covariance proportion (CP) is the part of the errors arising
from other, unsystematic factors.1 
Table 2 shows that the BP is small in all forecasting rounds, which means that FPB
forecasts can be considered as unbiased. The VP of first round forecasts, however,
is quite large. This should not come as a surprise as the available business cycle
related information at that moment does not provide clear indications for the year
ahead. Hence, first round forecasts are commonly based on a plausible trend sce-
nario, which is obviously subject to upside and downside risks. If one of those
risks or another shock materialises, the variability of the outcomes will be higher
than that of the forecasts. In all cases, the CP represents the highest proportion,
which leads to the conclusion that the nature of the forecast errors is mainly un-
systematic and simply due to the fact that economic variables are stochastic.
For a small, open economy as Belgium yet another question to examine is wheth-
er and to what extent the observed forecast errors are due to false exogenous
assumptions. The development of foreign export markets is a crucial exogenous
variable for forecasting Belgian GDP. The export market hypothesis is typically
based on weighted (reflecting the geographical orientation of Belgian exports)
import growth figures taken from the most recent short-term forecasts of interna-
tional organisations (EC, OECD, IMF). 
The regression line in Graph 2 shows that there is a clear positive relationship be-
tween the forecast errors made in export markets and GDP growth. Rewriting
history, one can try to examine what would have been the GDP forecast if the cor-
rect export market figure was known at the moment of the forecasting exercise.
To calculate this in a simplified manner, GDP forecasts were adjusted based on the
error in the export market figure and the estimated elasticity between GDP and ex-
port markets.2 Correcting GDP forecasts in that way and comparing them again to
the realizations, the absolute forecast error is reduced on average by more than
50%, both in the first and the second round forecasts and for almost all individual
years. The fact that the regression line in the graph crosses the intersection of both
axes and divides the quadrants in almost equal parts is another indication for the
unbiased character of the GDP forecasts.
1. See Guitierrez and Vuchelen (2001).
2. This elasticity was derived from a model simulation with Modtrim, in response to a shock on the
export markets. The average value of the elasticity is 0.19 over the first four quarters after the
shock.Working Paper 4-06
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C.Assessing the quality of potential GDP growth projections
The FPB prepares medium-term macroeconomic projections for the Belgian econ-
omy since the beginning of the eighties. This baseline is an unchanged policy
scenario, notably with regard to fiscal and social policies, based on a “neutral” in-
ternational environment. Scenario analysis is sometimes performed to illustrate
potential risks surrounding the baseline or to analyse the effects of changes in
economic policy. The economic outlook for the Belgian economy is published
each year in May1 and presented to the representatives of the social partners
within the Central Economic Council. This medium-term outlook takes as a start-
ing point the forecasts for the current year from the economic budget and covers
a five years’ period. These projections are updated in October by incorporating
the latest short-term forecasts (elaborated for the new budget) and are used as the
macroeconomic framework for the Belgian stability programme.
Although the outlook is a very detailed macroeconomic projection covering evo-
lutions by industry, the labour market, public finances and even energy
consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions, we will limit our analysis
here to potential GDP estimates which are crucial to assess the credibility of multi-
annual budgetary programmes. To check the accuracy of one-year ahead poten-
tial GDP growth forecasts we follow the method used by Jonung and Larch (2006)
for other European countries.2 
The results are presented in Graph 3.3 Following a period of relatively low eco-
nomic growth during the first half of the eighties, potential GDP growth was
clearly underestimated at the end of that decade. On the opposite, high growth
figures during the period 1987-1990 generated hopes of higher potential growth
which did not materialize. The period following the 1993 recession was charac-
terised by more cautious forecasts and thus a slight underestimation of potential
growth while the end of the nineties and the believe in “the new economy” gave
rise to overly optimistic projections. This analysis clearly illustrates the difficulty
to disentangle the trend from the cycle at the end of the sample: a sustained peri-
od of economic upswing tends to make the forecaster think that this upswing is
permanent, while a prolonged period of slow growth has the inverse effect. How-
ever, Belgian potential growth turned out to be ex post quite stable during the past
twenty years.
The statistics in Table 3 show a slight overestimation of Belgian potential GDP
growth over the period 1987-2003, but this negative mean error (see column ME)
is not statistically different from zero at conventional confidence levels (see col-
umn No bias). The forecasting errors clearly exhibit serial correlation (see column
No corr) which doesn’t come as a surprise considering the explanations given in
the previous paragraph. Table 3 also shows that the accuracy of the forecasts (see
columns MAE and RMSE) is quite similar to that in France but clearly better than in
Germany and Italy, with only the UK performing better.
1. During the course of time the exact publication date has evolved slightly as well as the fre-
quency, but at least one outlook has been published each year in spring since 1980.
2. The methodology is recalled in the footnotes of Table 3.
3. The forecasting error is defined as the “actual” value minus the forecasted value. Thus a positive




IV Lessons from the Belgian experience
The fiscal councils that have been created in Belgium have contributed to the in-
disputable improvement of Belgian public finances over the last ten years (see
Graph 4). Although their characteristics correspond to Belgian specificities and
may not be transposed as such to other countries, three main lessons can be
drawn from the Belgian experience for the purpose of designing this type of in-
stitutions elsewhere: 
- The institutions dealing with positive economics should enjoy a fully
independent status, but owing to the specific knowledge required to fulfil
their tasks, they should remain public.
- Since normative economics are linked to preferences, it is much more dif-
ficult for public opinion to accept a complete transfer of this kind of
responsibility to an independent institution. This justifies the necessity
for complete institutional separation between positive and normative
issues.
- One way to make the budgetary process successful is to share responsi-
bility between several strong independent institutions and experts to
minimize political pressure on each of the individuals or institutions.
Finally, a recommendation from the European Council, saying that everyone
would benefit, in the long term, from having independent national forecasting
authorities, would be very welcome. This acknowledgment would give more
guarantees of independence to national institutions. This would also send a good
signal to new and acceding Member States which are in the process of reforming
their institutions. The decision by the Finnish authorities to put the issue of the
influence of national fiscal rules and institutions on fiscal policy-making on the
agenda of their Presidency (during the second half of 2006), is certainly a step in
the right direction. Besides, if independent institutions were to be generally im-
plemented, it could pave the way for working groups at the EU level, made up of
these institutions and the Commission, which would have a mandate to advise
on shared methodologies and to discuss assumptions, sensitivity tests and
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VI Appendix
TABLE 1 - Timing of the Belgium budgetary process and forecasts
TABLE 2 - Key forecast error statistics (1994-2005)
Source: Federal Planning Bureau, National Accounts Institute.
Belgium European Commission Eurosystem
May Medium and long-term projections Spring forecasts
June HCF report Integrated Guidelines Projection
July Provisional short-term forecast
August
September Economic budget Interim forecasts
October Budget
National Reform Programme (NRP)
November Stability Programme (SP) Autumn forecasts
December Projection 
January Assessment of SP and NRP
February Economic budget updated Interim forecasts
March Budgetary control
April
Economic growth CPI inflation
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
MAE 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.5
Theil 1 (random walk) 0.72 0.51 0.75 0.86
Theil 2 (10-year mov. avg.) 1.68 0.81 0.73 0.56
Theil 3 (ARIMA-forecast) 1.11 0.77 0.69 0.74
Breakdown of MSE
BP 10.7% 0.3% 3.9% 6.7%
VP 45.3% 6.3% 38.6% 18.7%
CP 44.1% 93.4% 57.6% 74.7%Working Paper 4-06
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TABLE 3 - One-year-ahead forecasting error of potential GDP growth (1987-2003)
Source: Belgium: own calculations based on historical FPB databases; other countries: Jonung and Larch (2006).
Methodology: the forecast of potential GDP growth for the year t is obtained by
HP-filtering the GDP series (historical data plus projected figures) contained in the
database of vintage t-1. “Actual” potential GDP growth is computed by applying
recursively (using each time the same sample as for the forecasted estimates) the
HP-filter on the latest available vintage of the GDP series.
Notes: ME = mean error
MAE = mean absolute error
RMSE = root mean squared error
No bias = probability for zero mean error
No corr = probability for uncorrelated errors (LM test with 2 lags)
Country ME MAE RMSE No bias No corr
Belgium -0.12 0.38 0.45 0.28 0.00
Germany -0.39 0.63 0.70 0.01 0.36
France -0.29 0.34 0.40 0.00 0.73
Italy -0.55 0.55 0.67 0.00 0.00
UK -0.05 0.26 0.40 0.62 0.03
GRAPH 1 - GDP growth: First round forecasts and outcomes
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GRAPH 2 - GDP forecasts and export market assumptions
(growth rate errors in percentage points)
Source: Federal Planning Bureau, National Accounts Institute.
GRAPH 3 - Potential GDP growth: Forecasting error
(in percentage points)
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GRAPH 4 - Evolution of Belgian public finances 
(in % of GDP)
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